March 19, 2001
1. Has NIF accepted these recommendations
(made on page six of the DOE report dated
12/19/95)?
Yes, NIF has been designed and it will be
governed consistent with these recommendations.
2. & 3. How has NIF implemented these
recommendations and what evidence do you
have to that affect?
The following brief history addresses these
issues and others raised in your memo dated
3/16/01.
On June 29, 1994, Congressman Ronald Dellums
requested that DOE resolve the question of
whether the National Ignition Facility, (NIF)
will aid or hinder U.S. non-proliferation
efforts before proceeding with substantial
budgetary commitments to construct NIF. The
DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
(with no programmatic responsibility for
NIF) examined NIF's nonproliferation implications
and issued a final report, 12-19-95, entitled,
The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and
the Issue of Nonproliferation. This study
concluded that, "the NIF supports the
nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the
United States."
This report made two specific recommendations
to reduce the proliferation risk. First,
it recommended that NIF use screening procedures,
alongside rigorous adherence to U.S. classification
guides, to reduce proliferation risk associated
with foreign presence on site. Second, to
"assure the American public and other
countries that NIF is not contributing to
vertical proliferation" the report recommended
that NIF initiate "specific openness
measures (i.e., transparency), especially
regarding classified experiments." Vertical
proliferation refers to increases in the
numbers of nuclear weapons or warheads or
the development of new nuclear weapons. A
new nuclear weapon would typically involve
a substantially new Warhead design concept
or advanced weapon concept.)
On October 20, 1994, then Secretary of the
Department of Energy, Hazel 0'Leafy approved
the Key Decision One for the National Ignition
Facility (NIF) which included establishing
Key Decision One Prime, prior to authorizing
the detailed design. The purpose of Key Decision
One Prime was to resolve the question of
whether or not the NIF will aid or hinder
our non-proliferation efforts.
On December 20, 1995, Secretary O'Leary approved
Key Decision One Prime indicating that NIF
will support the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation
objectives. This decision allowed release
of construction funds for the site-independent
design of NIF.
On April 15, 1996, the Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC) issued a
report entitled, Transparency Measures for
the National Ignition Facility,. The NIF
Project Office has contracted with SAIC to
identify and analyze transparency measures
that would best accomplish these goals.
Transparency implies the ability to see through,
as with a photographic slide or view graph.
Essentially, transparency is about information
and access. In the case of NIF, transparency
is necessary to prove that NIF will not be
used for vertical proliferation, that NIF
will not violate any U.S. arms control and
nonproliferation laws, policies, and international
obligations.
The SAIC report stated, "There is a
fundamental transparency inherent in NIF's
role as a major international science research
center for basic physics and inertia1 fusion
energy. Collaboration on basic energy and
physics research will bring many scientists,
both foreign and domestic, to NIF. International
collaboration on ICF was recommended by several
U.S. science advisory panels and became possible
when the United States declassified almost
all ICF research. While the presence of foreign
scientists and American scientists without
security clearances is a potential proliferation
risk, it also is, de facto, a transparency
measure. Their access to the facility, participation
in non-weapons ICF research, and publication
of results will help inform the broader scientific
community, both domestic and international,
about NIF's programs and technical capabilities.
This study assumes those inherent transparencies
as a starting point and builds upon them."
4. Have specific procedures been established
so the Administration and Congress can ensure
that the weapons laboratories are not engaging
in research and development at NIF that encourages
vertical proliferation."
Yes, since the beginning of NIF. Most recently,
on December 15, 2000, when Dr. David Crandall,
Assistant Deputy Administrator for Research,
Development and Simulation in the U.S. Department
of Energy, assigned George Miller as the
National NIF Director, the responsibility
of coordinating the national users effort
for NIF. In that capacity, Miller is developing
a NIF Governance plan. He has formed a national
committee to advise him on this plan. By
agreement between the DOE and LLNL, the plan
developed will include provisions to assure
that U.S. nonproliferation goals are satisfied
through measures examined in the above studies.
5. Is the NIF oversight part of any public
process: Congressional hearings for new appropriations,
periodic meetings and reviews?
Yes, NIF has undergone continual reviews
from a variety, of organizations, including
the National Academy of Sciences, the Department
of Energy, the university of California,
the Secretary of the Energy Advisory Board,
the General Accounting Office, and the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. The independent
experts conducting these reviews include
some with expertise in nonproliferation issues.
All reviewers had access to all NIF information,
including plans for classified experiments.
6. In the original funding for NIF construction,
did Congress specify any conditions related
to nuclear proliferation?
Yes, as explained in the brief history above.
7. - 9. These questions relate to openness
measures, especially regarding classified
and unclassified NIF experiments: Have specified
procedures been established? Will the remaining
80% of experiments be devoted to energy and
science experiments? Can LLNL confirm that
80% of the work will be devoted to peaceful
applications?
NIF is a means of understanding basic science
that occurs in astrophysical phenomena like
the stars, planets, black holes, and nuclear
weapons. In this context, both classified
and unclassified NIF experiments can contribute
to a better understanding of nuclear weapons
physics. This same basic science furthers
our understanding of many topics including
inertial fusion energy. The end use of the
science is different, but the science is
the same. It is important to remember, however,
that NIF supports the safety and reliability
of our Stockpile Stewardship Program and
is essential to U.S. acceptance of the Comprehensive
Test Ban.
10. Would someone at LLNL be willing to state
formally that NIF can not be used to destructive
purposes?
NIF is not a means of developing nuclear
weapons. It is not a weapon. It is a research
tool that will help scientists better understand
nuclear weapons, fusion energy, and the origins
of our universe. NIF will be used for constructive
purposes: to maintain the safety and reliability
of our nuclear stockpile without nuclear
testing; to take us closer to harnessing
a safe, clean, abundant form of energy; and,
to unlock the secrets of the origins of the
universe.
Bruce E. Warner
Deputy Associate Director (Acting)
National Ignition Facility Programs
phone: 925-422-9237
fax: 925-423-5957
e-mail: warner2@llnl.gov