DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
AND
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3050
21 October 2002
The Nuclear Posture Review recognizes the
changing world and the continued need for
nuclear weapons as part of the new Triad.
Maintaining confidence in our nuclear deterrence
capabilities remains a supreme national interest.
I see major challenges, however, facing both
NNSA and DoD in meeting this responsibility
over the coming decades. We will need to
refurbish several aging weapon systems but
the limitations of the nuclear weapon complex
will not permit us to perfectly replicate
the original designs. We must also be prepared
to respond to new nuclear weapon requirements
in the future.
These challenges are magnified by the uncertainties
in our knowledge about nuclear components
and their performance. We are significantly
improving our tools for inspecting and assessing
these components, but ironically, new findings
suggest that we may previously have been
overconfident. Experience has shown that
problems have not been always initially assessed
correctly and that we have not clearly differentiated
between the risks inherent in weapon assessments
with those associated with performing assessments
without the aid of nuclear tests. In light
of this, how do we accurately assess the
current stockpile or a modified stockpile
in the future?
I believe we should take immediate steps
to review our current approach to managing
the risks inherent in the Stockpile Stewardship
Program and then to strengthen our processes
for assessing these risks. There are undoubtedly
a number of ways to do this. Although my
thinking is still evolving on these issues,
there are three steps which I feel could
be taken. If you agree with my assessment
and approach I would then ask that Ambassador
Brooks task the NNSA Laboratory Directors
to accomplish the actions identified below.
Assess Technical Limitations and Risks to
Annual Certification. An annual discussion
of the technical limitations and, where possible,
quantification of the resulting risks associated
with the nuclear weapon annual assessments
would provide better understanding and confidence
in the process than is provided today. It
would also be desirable to assess the potential
benefits that could be obtained from a return
to nuclear testing with regard to weapon
safety, security and reliability. This could
be included as part of the annual assessment
letters or done separately from that process.
Assess Risks in the Current Nuclear Stockpile.
In 1987, the design laboratories compiled
a "Report to Congress on the Stockpile
Reliability, Weapon Remanufacture, and the
Role of Nuclear Testing." For its time,
this study provided a comprehensive understanding
of the technical risks associated with nuclear
weapons assessments. NNSA could update this
study and extend the discussion of stockpile
problems and post-deployment testing to 1992,
when testing stopped. Maintaining confidence
without testing could then be discussed for
stockpile changes made since 1992 or planned
in the future. Concurrent with this NNSA
effort, I will task DoD to assess the confidence
in the aging and/or refurbished nuclear delivery
platforms.
Review Approaches for Managing Risk in the
Stockpile Stewardship Program. Drawing on
our years of operating under the test moratorium,
the Nuclear Weapons Council should review
the current risk management strategy of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program. As a possible
first step, I intend to request that the
intelligence community, with NNSA support,
conduct an appraisal of foreign stockpile
stewardship practices. We might gain new
insights for our program from an understanding
of others.
In 1995, a Stockpile Confidence Conference
provided a joint forum for discussing Stockpile
Stewardship issues. A second such conference
should be convened to review the confidence
in today's nuclear deterrent to include the
status of assessment capabilities, alternative
approaches for reducing risks and the limits
on the extent to which improved understanding
of weapon physics can be used as a basis
for confidence. For my part, I intend to
ask ADM Ellis to again host this conference.
A last suggestion is for the laboratories
to readdress the value of a low yield testing
program. During the late 1980s and 1990s
considerable effort, including several nuclear
tests, were expended to study the possibility
of maintaining the nuclear stockpile under
very restricted testing conditions. How might
such a program increase confidence now?
In closing, I recognize that assessing and
reducing risk is extremely difficult, and
that there might be other approaches to addressing
these issues. It is of great interest to
all of us to have the highest possible confidence
in the stockpile and to understand the risks
in the absence of testing. I welcome your
thoughts on this very important matter.
E.C. Aldrige, Jr
Chairman